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The years since the onset of the global financial crisis saw a wave of protests all 
over the world, and among them were a series of mass strikes in the Global South that 
have not yet been investigated extensively, with the exception of the mass strikes in 
China  and the strikes in South African mining in 2012. My current research on mass 
strikes in Brazil and India has revealed that there are enormous similarities despite very 
different local, regional and national contexts and path dependencies. The strike waves 
in the construction sector between 2011 and 2013 in Brazil and the strikes in the Indian 
automobile sector are examples of strikes in central sectors of the national economies. 
These sectors have witnessed continual growth over the past 15 years, and at the same 
time workers experienced deteroriating working conditions, such as lower wages, an 
increase in contract work and/or a higher work speed. The focus in the initial phase of 
the strikes was on wage demands and working conditions, but during the course of the 
struggles a political dimension emerged quite quickly. In a number of cases, workers 
organized wildcat strikes or developed activities that could not be controlled by the 
trade unions, e.g. setting fire to workplace premises, expelling union representatives 
with violent means or killing managers. And many of these strikes were met with 
repression, such as the repeated deployment of the national guard and military police to 
break strikes in Brazil or the arbitrary arrest and long-term imprisonment of workers in 
India. 
According to a categorical assessment of mass strikes, inspired by the seminal 
work of Rosa Luxemburg (1906), the defining characteristics with which one can 
distuingish mass strikes from any strike that includes a lot of workers, will be discussed 
(see also Nowak and Gallas 2014). Beyond general characteristics, mass strikes may 
have different forms of how they unfold on an organizational and geographical scale. In 
order to assess these specific dynamics, I will refer to the approach of labour geography 
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that includes the notion of space into research on the prerequisites of labour struggles 
(Herod 1997). 
I take the following steps in this paper: First, I will give a description of the 
scope of the mass strikes mentioned. In doing so I will provide some ideas about which 
kind of solidarity was effective for which reasons and outline the limits for solidarity 
that exist. Second, I assess the specific dynamics of the mass strikes in question. 
Finally, I will draw conclusions for a future perspective of transnational solidarity for 
mass strikes in the age of austerity and global slump. 
 
Mass strikes after 2008 in Brazil and India 
The years after 2008 saw a wave of mass strikes in the Global South, with many 
of these strikes going beyond the established patterns of trade union action. Focusing on 
the strikes in in the construction industry in Brazil between 2011 and 2013, and strikes 
in the automobile sector in India in 2011/2012, important structural and political 
similarities are obvious: All three sectors are central sectors of the respective 
economies, they saw constant growth rates in the past 15 years, while wage levels 
decreased despite growth. In the following, I will briefly describe the dynamics of the 
strikes mentioned and the role of transnational solidarity in these strikes. 
 
Construction sector in Brazil 
The Brazilian construction sector saw continual growth rates, increasing by 49.6 
percent between 2004 and 2012 (DIESSE 2013; Blanford/Cummings 2013). In 2011, 
7.8 million workers join the construction sector, 8.4 percent of the total workforce. 
Between 1998 and 2008 the construction sector saw an influx of 200,000 workers. In 
2011 and 2012, the strikes of contruction workers saw a peak: 580,000 construction 
workers went on strike in 2011, and 500,000 construction workers in 19 regional states 
went on strike in 2012. The major grievances were wage differences between and within 
regions and workplaces and harsh restrictions on holidays: Many workers work away 
from their families and were only allowed to leave the workplace every three to six 
months. Helpers were not allowed any leave in some places. In addition, housing 
facilities, transport and food for workers were regularly abdominable. 
The first big and hitherto unprecedented strike wave, the biggest since the strikes 
in 1980 in the Sao Paulo area, occurred in February and March 2011 when 170,000 
construction workers went on strike. The strike wave started in a number of smaller 
120 
 
construction sites in the state of Bahia in February, including 80,000 workers. In the 
middle of March, the strike wave extended to the whole country, predominantly to the 
big construction sites of the government program PAC (Programa de Aceleração do 
Crescimento): The biggest mobilization occurred at two industrial complexes, a refinery 
and a petrochemical complex, in Suape, in the state of Pernambuco, involving 35,000 
workers (Véras 2013, 2014). The hydroelectric plants in Jirau and Santo Antontio in the 
state of Rodonia saw huge mobilizations as well with 20,000 and 16,000 workers and 
another focal point in March 2011 was in the state of Ceará at the construction of a 
thermoelectric plant in Pecém with 6,000 workers on strike. The special feature of the 
strikes on the sites that belong to PAC was the absence of trade unions in the initial 
phase of the mobilizations and the practice of burning the housing facilities and other 
parts of premises by the striking workers. As their protest was directed against the 
miserable conditions of housing, the demand for better housing was put into practice by 
setting ablaze the former facilities. The different strikes did not start based on a 
common call, but broke out more or less independently from each other, though media 
reports might have had a role in triggering more conflicts after the first strikes started. In 
the area of Jirau the federal government ordered the national guard (Força Nacional) to 
break the strike immediately after it broke out. 
 
Car production in India  
Car production in India is one of many sectors that is expanding and driving the 
economy. Passenger car sales grew at 15.2 per cent per year between 2005-06 and 2010-
11. Growth in the industry fell after 2011 and collapsed in 2013. At the same time, the 
real wages of auto workers dropped since 2000 from 80,000 rupees a year in 2000-01 to 
65,000 rupees in 2009-10 (Annual Survey of Industries), while the output of cars 
tripled.   
In India, one out of two factories of the biggest car passenger producer Maruti 
Suzuki saw two wildcat strikes in June and October 2011 and labor unrest in July 2012. 
The Maruti company was a state enterprise in the past, but is controlled at present by the 
Japanese multinational Suzuki. The factory at Manesar was seen as a model factory – it 
opened in 2007 and recruited young workers, and was set up in a new industrial area 
with only a small village nearby. The management thought that these young workers 
without experiences in labor organizing, located in a remote area, could be handled 
more easily and employed at lower wages. Permanent workers only accounted for 25 
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percent of the workforce, while the remaining employees were contract workers from 
60 different contractors, trainees, and apprentices that earn much lower wages. In 2011 
contract workers earned about half of the wage of a permanent worker (9,000 rupees vs. 
17,000 rupees/month). Only 1,054 workers were permanent in summer 2012, and there 
were 416 technical trainees, 225 apprentices and 2,700 contract workers (PUDR 2013, 
http://www.pudr.org/?q=content/driving-force-labour-struggles-and-violation-rights-
maruti-suzuki-india-limited).   
The conflict in the Manesar factory that has unfolded since has gained 
significance over the wildcat strikes at Honda in Gurgaon in 2005/2006 that were 
followed by many smaller strike movements. The workers in the Manesar factory aimed 
to set up their own trade union, the Maruti Suzuki Workers’ Union (MSWU), while the 
company wanted them to join the trade union in the mother plant, Maruti Udyog 
Kamgar Union (MUKU). The workers in Manesar saw MUKU as a management-led 
trade union and insisted on their right to choose their own trade union. The reasons 
behind wanting to establish their own union were: wage issues, the huge extent of 
contract labor, high work speed, harassment by supervisors and the lack of breaks that 
would enable workers to go to the toilet and have food or drinks.  
After the company tried to force the permanent workers in Manesar to join the 
union MUKU, they went on a two-week long wildcat strike in June 2011 during which 
all categories of workers participated. The company did not recognize the MSWU trade 
union and resorted to a lock-out of all contract workers in late September. The response 
to this company move was the blockade of the gates and a second wildcat strike by the 
permanent workers for another two weeks in October 2011. This time, three 
neighbouring Suzuki factories that produce engines for Maruti Suzuki and motorcycles 
also went out on strike, as well as another 14 factories in the area some of which are 
suppliers to Maruti Suzuki. The striking feature of the Honda case a few years before 
was that a joint strike of contract and permanent workers in 2005 led to better 
conditions for permanent workers, and a subsequent strike of Honda contract workers in 
2006 remained isolated and unsuccessful. In contrast to these events, it remained a 
feature of the strike at the Manesar factory that contract and permanent workers acted in 
solidarity – a fact that caused widespread fear among employers. The second strike in 
October 2011 ended with an agreement between workers and the company that did not 
include substantial changes of work conditions. In the course of 2012, the independent 
trade union could finally register under the name Maruti Suzuki Employees Union 
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(MSEU), but none of its demands were met and talks with the management collapsed in 
the summer of 2012. In this already tense situation, a worker was slapped by a 
supervisor and subsequently sacked after he filed a complaint. That led to negotiations 
between the trade union and management, and in the course of that day, July 18, 2012, 
violence broke out in the factory that left 50 managers injured and one dead. After the 
unrest, the workers fled from the premises and the factory remained closed for one 
month. The company fired 2,300 (1,800 contract and 500 permanent) workers 
arbitrarily, and 148 workers were arrested with the charge of murder. These workers 
have remained in jail until today (September 30, 2014) without bail being granted, and 
without a sentence.  
 
Inorganic Transnational Solidarity 
In order to assess a new form of international solidarity that emerges from the 
mass strikes, I will combine Luxemburg’s insights into the special features of mass 
strikes (1906) with Herod’s insights (1997) into the specific spatial limits and dynamics 
of labour mobilisation. Rosa Luxemburg puts emphasis on the fact that mass strikes do 
not follow a ready-made path, thereby distancing herself both from the anarchist myth 
of ‘the general strike as a means of inaugurating the revolution’ (1906, 112) and the 
bureaucratic engineers of the workers movement in German social democracy ‘who 
would, in the manner of a board of directors, put the mass strike in Germany on the 
calendar on an appointed day, and those who, like the participants in the trade-union 
congress at Cologne, would by a prohibition of “propaganda” eliminate the problem of 
the mass strike from the face of the earth’ (1906, 116). Instead, Rosa Luxemburg 
describes the mass strike as an outcome of specific social and political conditions, as a 
mass action that cannot be directed by political leaders: ‘If, therefore, the Russian 
Revolution teaches us anything, it teaches above all that the mass strike is not 
artificially “made”, not “decided” at random, not “propagated”, but that it is a historical 
phenomenon, which, at a given moment, results from social conditions with historical 
inevitability’ (1906, 117). Luxemburg describes the mass strike as a tactic of the 
workers movement with five features: (1) Its forms are constantly changing, sometimes 
mass strikes start with a political programme and end with purely economic demands, 
or they begin with demands related to the work situation and evolve into full-fledged 
political struggles (Luxemburg 1906, 127f, 144). (2) Mass strikes disrupt political life 
and enter into the public debate (Luxemburg 1906, 140f). (3) They have a mobilizing 
123 
 
aspect for the working class as a whole, as workers experience their collective power 
and receive a quick political education during these strikes (1906, 140). (4) Mass strikes 
flow from one part of the country to other parts without a proper central organisation 
(1906, 120-29). (5) Mass strikes are not the final solution for the quest of the workers’ 
movement how to conquer political power: they too have to be transformed into another 
political strategy: ‘The role of the political mass strike alone is exhausted but at the 
same time, the transition of the mass strike into a general popular rising is not yet 
accomplished’ (1906, 140). It is quite obvious that the strike movements I have 
described in the first part all match with the criteria developed by Luxemburg with 
reference to the mass strikes in Russia between 1896 and 1905. But in order to catch 
their specificities I aim to grasp the spatial dynamics of mobilisation, because these are 
relevant to the issue of international solidarity. Andrew Herod developed his approach 
of Labour Geography in order to provide attention to ‘workers as active geographical 
agents’ (1997, 2) that ‘shape economic landscapes and uneven development’ (1997, 1). 
As it is the case for capital, the agency of workers is restricted due to pre-existing social 
and political conditions (1997, 16), but labour is like capital establishing spatial fixes as 
a part of the overall dynamic of capitalist accumulation (1997, 17). Thus, solidarity is 
conceived by Herod as a successful effort to establish a certain spatial fix (1997, 20). 
And, most relevant to my account of international solidarity is Herod´s claim that 
workers are also producing the geographical scales on which the conflict with capital is 
fought out (1997, 18).  
All the three different national waves of mass strikes exhibit the characteristics 
stated by Luxemburg, most of all a quick diffusion of practices and organisational 
learning on a mass scale, contradicting widespread romanticising and/or conservative 
notions that describe mass strikes as ‘wild’ or ‘spontaneous’. Nevertheless, these strike 
waves meet spatial limits and patterns of mobilisation that differ to some extent and can 
be understood as national and regional specificities. So, what are the organizational and 
spatial dynamics of the mass strikes that I described in the previous section? Basically, 
three kinds of dynamics can be found in these three waves of mass strikes: (1) a first 
pattern is diffusion of a certain form of strike within one sector, copycat strikes; (2) a 
second pattern is the diffusion of strikes, although not necessarily in the same form, to 
other sectors in the same national framework; and (3) the third pattern is the 
establishment of certain forms of strikes and the diffusion of experiences in one 
industrial region, at times across sectors. 
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Conclusion: Strategies for transnational solidarities in the new global conjuncture. 
The mass strikes since 2008 are part of a global conjuncture of struggles that 
emerged in the years after the global financial meltdown. If we translate the way strikes 
referenced each other in the strike waves on the national or regional level, we might 
have a blueprint to rethink international solidarity. Street protests copied each other 
without any organic links: The Tahrir Square movement inspired the Spanish 
indignados that inspired Occupy in the USA, all during 2011. These street protests were 
seen as a (vaguely) connected movement by a number of commentators that compared 
the protests since 2011 with the protests around the year 1968 (Castells 2012; Kraushaar 
2012; Mason 2013). The connection between these movements were, first, the modes of 
action, e.g. occupation of squares, and second, the crucial role of educated young 
people, and third that they happened more or less at the same time within the year 2011. 
The transnational mass strikes since 2011 were a parallel development to the street 
protests, starting with mass strikes in Egypt and China in 2010, and expanding into 
other countries since 2011. I contend that the global wave of mass strikes has to be seen 
in a similar light as the street protests: A transnational wave, but characterised by 
national patterns of mobilisation. These mass strikes were mainly based on informal 
networks between workers. In the case of the Brazilian construction sector there have 
been no tight organizational structures that organized the strike wave, but many 
informal contacts between workers (see Luxemburg 1906, 120-129 on mass strikes in 
Russia). The same goes for the strikes in the Gurgaon region. The circulation of 
struggles is based on a circulation of experiences, enhanced by quick rotation between 
workplaces and a high amount of labour migration inside of national states. The 
solidarity during the strike waves was not based on a unified commando, but on an 
uncontrolled proliferation of strike movements, although there have been some 
organized kernels. This is not at all meant to celebrate the strikes as ‘spontaneous’. The 
strikes have been well organized and well prepared in most of the cases.  
Beyond any organic connections between the strike waves it was the sheer fact 
of their contemporeanity over two years which is astonishing: Revolts in Brazilian 
construction in February/March 2011, occupations at Maruti Suzuki in June and 
October 2011, uprising at Maruti Suzuki in July 2012, revolt in Suape in August 2012, 
revolt at Belo Monte in November 2012. Similar trends of investment and restructuring 
of work, of the global economic downturn, of new expectations of workers and of new 
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means of communication between workers led to an explosion of unrest in the 
workplaces – in the same way that street protests were emerging around different 
continents in the years after 2011. There were spatial limits of the strike waves in terms 
of mobilisation (Herod 2003). In Brazil these spatial limits coincided with national 
borders. Given the transnational organisation of domination, this confinement to the 
national public is a decisive weakness – but it can be the sheer contemporeanity of 
struggles that becomes a mobilizing factor on its own, and it is this effect and its 
dynamics that remain to be understood better in research on mass strikes. 
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